












ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT

فلسطين PALESTINE
تنهض EMERGING





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PROLOGUE



PALESTINE EMERGING is an initiative of the Palestinian Reconstruction and Economic Partnership (PREP).

WHO WE ARE

We are a cooperative private-sector initiative. We represent the emerging consensus of a pro-bono coalition of over 100 leaders and experts drawn from a wide range of Palestinian and international civil-society groups, technical organizations and funding institutions.

This blueprint defines principles for the long-term economic reconstruction and development of Palestine.

For more information, please visit palestine-emerging.org

- Chapters and summaries of this blueprint
- Catalogue of work with links to relevant studies
- Summaries of coordinated activities undertaken by parallel organizations
- Analysis on econometrics modelling, projections and survey insights
- Updates and progress as they emerge

PALESTINE EMERGING is grateful for the extraordinary efforts of many individuals whose time, insights, experience and patience helped develop this work.

Samieh Al-Abed
Mohammed Abukhaizaran
Zayne Abudaka
C. Ross Anthony
Maher Awartani
Adnan Azazmeh
Andrew Beath
Azem Bishara
Mette Brix
Daniel Brooks
Stephen Byers
Sean Carroll
Shelly Culbertson
Chris Choa
Nicola Cobbold
John Collins
Roland Chanin-Morris
Emad Elian
Chamith Fernando
Jason Foley
Baron Frankal

Larry Garber
Anastasia Gekis
Yousef Habesch
Zaha Hassan
Samir Hulileh
Shifa Jayousi
Brian Katulis
Eric Hazan
Abed Khatib
Stefan Koeberle
Rami Khoury
Nahid Majid
David Meredith
Bob Miller
Jan Nielsen
Sowmya Parthasarathy
Eric Pelofsky
Thomas Penny
Jim Pickup
Sarah Poole
David Prais

Jack Randolph
Stephanie Rogers
Kobi Ruthenberg
Joe Saba
George Salem
Bautista Santamarina
Thomas Sevcik
Obada Shtaya
Shireen Shelleh
Howard Sumka
Hugo Tay
Nura Treish
Peter van Toorn Brix
Toni Verstandig
Kathrine Waidtlow
Sebastian Welisiejko
Katherine Wilkins
George Willcoxon
Hesham Youssef
Wael Zakout

PALESTINE EMERGING

Even as conflict continues, it is not too early to set out an inclusive and robust plan for economic reconstruction.

How can we create the **most value for the greatest number of Palestinians**? Which initiatives should be prioritized? How should we coordinate efforts so they can be more productive?

Planning for the future might seem premature; emergency recovery will be the priority. However, pragmatic **short-term actions need a long-term vision** to maximize their impact, improve coordination, and ensure provision of services and solutions in the right place and at the right scale. Major short-term investments will influence Palestine for generations to come. Without a long-term perspective, short-term actions may unintentionally undermine the potential of longer-term opportunities and the speed of sustainable recovery from a devastating starting point.

See also:

Gaza Early Recovery, Re-Construction and Resilience Programme (UNDP 3/2024)

We believe **long-term plans open new political horizons**. They encourage stakeholders to support emerging security and governance frameworks. They define investible conditions that align donors' involvement in ways that can benefit the Palestinian population, and they engage local populations to help them reinvent themselves.

PALESTINE EMERGING is an informed and ambitious framework intended to guide actions related to economic stabilization, infrastructure networks, social assets, economic growth, soft power, and community engagement. It offers a framework to **help coordinate wider multi-stakeholder efforts**. We anticipate our vision will serve a national agenda, stressing relationships between Gaza and the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) as part of an integrated, independent Palestinian State.

POLITICAL PRECONDITIONS

We consciously choose not to address political preconditions or reiterate historical definitions. While we acknowledge these issues are relevant, others will address them elsewhere. We believe that **informed, long-term understanding of economic needs and opportunities** will contribute to political resolution and it is in this spirit that we have come together to produce PALESTINE EMERGING.

NOTES ABOUT TEXT

Throughout this document, body text occasionally appears in bold font. These instances represent specific ideas that were introduced, socialized, and accepted during extended discussions. Stakeholders are continuing to develop many of these ideas independently. We will report on their progress through our companion website: www.palestine-emerging.org.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

PLAN EARLY

- Define long-term strategies to inform short-term solutions.

WORK TOGETHER

- Coordinate strategies, planning, and implementation.

CAPTURE QUICK WINS

- Create identity and increase local engagement.

EXPLORE A RANGE OF ENABLING OPTIONS

- Consider alternative financing and delivery mechanisms.

BUILD ON WHAT HAS GONE BEFORE

- Don't duplicate efforts.

STABILIZATION AND EARLY RECOVERY WILL LAST FOR YEARS

PALESTINE EMERGING seeks to complement the immediate actions of humanitarian aid agencies with ideas for long-term local capability building and investment.

FOOD SECURITY

Meet the population's basic needs.

OCCUPANCY ASSISTANCE

Deliver innovative solutions for interim camps/temporary housing.

ENERGY/WATER SUPPLY

Provide interim sources before independent supply can be developed.

HAZARD REMOVAL

Focus on unexploded ordnance and debris clearance.

HEALTH AND EDUCATION

Immediate interventions at massive scale.

BUILDING CONDITION ASSESSMENT

Address vertical assets and public realm.

SECURITY (POLICING)

Address threats from opportunistic militias.

DEFINITION OF TITLES AND RIGHTS


Address contested property.

FAMILY REUNIFICATION

Focus on social work and mental health.

STAKEHOLDER AND RESOURCE COORDINATION

Align actions and priorities.



FOUNDATIONS

2

PALESTINE EMERGING seeks to complement ongoing national efforts with informed long-term strategies. We focus on Palestine's potential as a globally-connected, competitive economy.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT

PALESTINE EMERGING anticipates ways the Palestinian economy can benefit from local and macro-trends already shaping other urban territories worldwide, build on its rich heritage, and overcome decades of constraint. For this purpose, we make assumptions about future conditions in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem with a regional perspective; specifically, these relate to:

- Overall political conditions (regional openness; removal of current constraints; Palestinian statehood)
- Economic relationships (state/city-level economic cooperation within region)
- Infrastructure (connectivity across Gaza and region)

TIMESCALES

For our purposes, we consider three timescales to provide a context when considering challenges and opportunities for Gaza and the West Bank:

- SHORT TERM (by 2030)
- MEDIUM TERM (by 2040)
- LONG TERM (by 2050)

UNDERSTANDING PALESTINE (CONTEXT AND BASELINE)

Achieving the PALESTINE EMERGING growth scenario will require decades of concerted efforts, large-scale investment and relaxation of the multi-layered system of restrictions that have hindered growth and employment in the Palestinian economy. The onset of war in 2023 exacerbated a long-standing history of economic dependence, fragility, volatility and poor overall performance.

PALESTINE EMERGING ANTICIPATES A GROWTH ALTERNATIVE TO A CONSTRAINED STATUS QUO

STATUS QUO SCENARIO (CONSTRAINED CONDITIONS)

- Sustained political and economic constraints
- Local zero-sum advantages with Israel
- Natural population growth until 2030
- Constraints to movement/trade partially lifted
- Lingering reliance on Israel
- Subordinate control of Gaza and West Bank

PALESTINE EMERGING SCENARIO (GROWTH CONDITIONS)

- Decreasing political and economic constraints
- Equitable engagement with broader region
- Substantial population growth
- Constraints to movement/trade fully lifted
- Diminishing reliance on Israel
- Sovereign control of Gaza and West Bank

1 A VOLATILE AND “PARTITIONED” ECONOMY, UNDERPERFORMING AGAINST THE REGION

Figures 1-2 below show growth patterns that characterize Palestine’s fragmented and volatile economic structure. Conflict-linked shocks dominated the last 20-30 years (with major negative impacts in the late 90s and early 2000s). The relative performance of Gaza and the West Bank remained closely correlated until the mid-2000s, as the Gaza Strip experienced an economically crushing blockade after Hamas came to power.

From 2006, GDP grew most years in the West Bank, but stagnation and volatility dominated Gaza. *Figure 3* demonstrates this divergence, with the West Bank showing resilience even during the six periods of strong negative growth following conflict-driven shocks in Gaza.

While GDP per capita almost doubled in the West Bank from 1994-2022 (despite a strong drawback during the pandemic, which also affected Gaza greatly), Gazans are poorer today than in 1994. *Figure 2* shows how the negligible difference in GDP per capita observed between regions in that year widened from 2006, with West Bank GDP per capita more than 260% higher than that of Gaza in 2022.

The relative decline of Gaza has depressed the economic performance of the Palestinian economy against the wider region over the last decade (*Figure 3*). As a result, while GDP per capita in the West Bank is higher than in Egypt and Jordan (*Figure 4*), the West Bank and Gaza combined underperform those comparative economies (with Gaza’s GDP per capita close to levels observed in poor Sub-Saharan African countries and 36 times lower than in neighboring Israel – itself a major driver of instability).

GDP GROWTH IN PALESTINE HAS BEEN DRIVEN BY THE WEST BANK




Figure 1 | PCBS (2022)

GDP PER CAPITA HAS BEEN CONTRACTING IN GAZA




Figure 2 | PCBS (2022)

GDP HAS INCREASED BY 27% IN WEST BANK SINCE 2013, CONTRACTED BY 18% IN GAZA




Figure 3 | PCBS (2022)

GDP PER CAPITA IN PALESTINE TRAILS OTHER REGIONAL ECONOMIES




Figure 4 | PCBS (2022), WORLD BANK WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

2 A LOW PRODUCTIVITY ECONOMY DOMINATED BY NON-TRADABLE SECTORS

In any given economy, “leading” or “specialized” tradable sectors (e.g. manufacturing, tourism, export-oriented digital services) drive activity, growth and employment, accompanied by “supporting” industries (e.g. public services, health and education, retail and commerce).

In Palestine, the weight of high-value, high-productivity, export-oriented industries in total employment is relatively low (Figure 5), where low-value services and wholesale retail employment make up the majority of all employment.

Most value added sectors are service oriented (Figure 6), with tradables and dynamic industries seriously hindered by Israeli-imposed restrictions on the movement of people and goods in the whole of Palestine.

As a result, labor productivity, measured by value added per employee, has remained largely stagnant in the West Bank over the last two decades, and in Gaza dropped to its lowest levels in 2022 (Figure 7), even before the latest round of violence. To achieve the aspiration of sustainable growth, it is essential to transition to higher value, export oriented, higher productivity sectors, making the most of the enormous untapped potential for economic diversification across Palestine.

EMPLOYMENT IS CONCENTRATED IN FRAGMENTED SERVICE-ORIENTED SECTORS AND WHOLESALE RETAIL...

% OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT BY ECONOMIC SECTOR, 2022




Figure 5 | PCBS (2022)

...WHICH ACCOUNT FOR AN EVEN LARGER SHARE OF TOTAL VALUE ADDED

% OF TOTAL VALUE ADDED BY ECONOMIC SECTOR, 2022




Figure 6 | PCBS (2022)

LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY HAS BEEN TRENDING DOWN FOR BOTH WEST BANK AND GAZA




Figure 7 | PCBS (2022)

3 UNEMPLOYMENT (AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT) ARE STUBBORNLY AND DANGEROUSLY HIGH, ESPECIALLY AMONG YOUTH

Poor growth and other characteristics discussed above correlate strongly with high unemployment (Figure 8). This is certainly true in the case of Palestine, with Gaza presenting alarmingly high rates of joblessness, both in absolute terms and in comparison to the wider region. In the West Bank, total unemployment has been resistant to economic growth, especially from 2006-2007, when it remained consistently above 10% despite periods of stronger economic performance.

At the same time, consistent with the start of “divergent” trajectories between the Palestinian regions, overall unemployment in Gaza spiked to staggeringly high levels, reaching 45% in 2022, before the 2023 war (Figure 9), the highest in the region.

The situation is particularly dramatic among women and young people, with nearly 9 in 10 female labor market participants aged 15-24 unemployed in Gaza in 2022 (Figure 10). Rebuilding the employment base with stable, high-quality jobs following economic diversification is crucial for prosperity and stability in the region.

WITH CLOSE TO HALF THE POPULATION UNEMPLOYED...




Figure 8 | PCBS (2020, 2023a)

...GAZA HAS AMONG THE WORST RATES OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND GDP PER CAPITA IN THE REGION




Figure 9 | PCBS (2023a), WORLD BANK WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT RATES ARE HIGHER FOR WOMEN IN BOTH THE WEST BANK AND GAZA




Figure 10 | PCBS (2023b)

4 PALESTINE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ISRAELI ECONOMY IS ONE OF IMBALANCE AND CAPTIVITY

It is impossible to understand Palestine's economic structure without acknowledging the norms and restrictions defined by Israel that affect all economic activity, including trade and exchange. Norms include Palestine's dependency on the Shekel, with a consequent lack of optimal monetary orientation.

The current customs union and the high dependency on taxes collected by Israel on behalf of the Palestinian Authority (PA) also results in fiscal fragility. Restrictions, originally imposed on security grounds, include Israel's long-standing control over activities in the West Bank. These constraints include barriers to movement of people and goods from the West Bank and Gaza, restrictions on aquifer access, and limits on mobile communications standards. They also impose low-quota restrictions on banking activities (e.g. cash shekel transfers to Israeli banks).

In this context, preconditions for sustainable growth include greater openness, economic diversification, and mutually advantageous links with Israel (recognizing proximity to a high-income OECD economy is a competitive advantage, yet to be fully exploited). Palestine's import and export trade with Israel remains high despite decreasing intensity in the past few years (*Figure 11*).

It is also important to note the interconnection through the labor market, with almost 25% of West Bank workers employed in Israel and Israeli settlements in 2022 (*Figure 12*), attracted by daily wages which were more than double those in the West Bank (*Figure 14*). However, this imbalance creates distortions in the Palestinian labor market with close to a quarter of all workers from the West Bank working in Israel.

DECOUPLING: IMPORTS AND EXPORTS TO AND FROM ISRAEL AS A SHARE OF TOTAL TRADE HAVE BEEN DECLINING




Figure 11 | PCBS (2023c)

BRAIN DRAIN: MORE WORKERS FROM THE WEST BANK ARE SEEKING EMPLOYMENT IN ISRAEL...




Figure 12 | PCBS (2023b)

...AND ACCOUNT FOR CLOSE TO A QUARTER OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT IN THE WEST BANK



Figure 13 | PCBS (2023b)

EXPANDING WAGE GAP: AVERAGE WAGES ARE LOWER IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA COMPARED TO ISRAEL AND THE GAP IS EXPANDING




Figure 14 | PCBS (2023b)

WAR WILL HAVE LONG-LASTING CONSEQUENCES FOR AN ALREADY FRAGILE SITUATION.

While a thorough, reliable, and comprehensive assessment of the devastation in both Gaza and the West Bank caused by the war starting in October 2023 is yet to be carried out, early indicators show major, unprecedented impacts on the built environment, production, labor market and beyond.

- The World Bank and UN estimate the cost of damage to critical infrastructure in Gaza at \$18.5 Billion by the end of February 2024 (equivalent to 97% of Gaza and the West Bank GDP combined).
- About half of all private sector enterprises halted or reduced their activities in Palestine, and there was almost total suspension in production at about 56,000 businesses in Gaza (where more than half of all establishments depend on internal trade).
- Employment in Gaza is at a historic low, with over 150,000 jobs disrupted (exceptions being employees in the health and humanitarian relief sectors). The loss of high-potential youth and a corresponding 'brain drain' throughout Palestine exacerbates the negative outlook.
- The almost total suspension of production in Gaza (operating at less than 15% of its capacity) has resulted in losses of around USD 25 million/day (not accounting for direct losses due to destruction of buildings and other assets).
- In the first two months of the war, production in the West Bank alone dropped by 40% compared to the previous year, with an estimated loss of more than USD 1 billion.
- In a conservative scenario, assuming that productivity (measured by GDP per employed person) remained constant between 2022 and 2023, we still project overall GDP to have dropped 50% by year-end 2023.

Statistical Yearbook of Palestine, 2023. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.

2050 STATUS QUO

Fragmented 7 million population

Continuing conflict migration, exodus across international borders

GDP per capita in Gaza around 50% lower than the mid-1990s

Hazardous environment, continuing ordnance and rubble removal

Constrained boundaries

Economic imbalances with hinterland

Demographic imbalance, with 65% of the population under the age of 30

Degraded infrastructure

Defunct currency and banking arrangements creating cash and credit shortages

Poor 2G/3G coverage, constraining industrial strategy and logistical arrangements

2050 PALESTINE EMERGING

Contiguous 13 million population

Attractive territory, focused on transnational trade and exchange

GDP per capita approaching middle-income economy standards

Regenerated next-generation public realm and natural environment

Reduced urban sprawl; proximity of amenities and services

Cost and regulatory advantages relative to neighbors and peers

Youth-oriented human capital for emerging digital sectors

Opportunities for 'leapfrog' next-generation technologies

Opportunity to switch to dollar-peg, with (Gulf) underwritten reserves

Total >5G coverage with resilient external physical connectivity and uplink technology

The constrained STATUS QUO Scenario, aggravated by the impacts of the war, need not be the future of Palestine – not least given the implications of instability for the wider region

PALESTINE WITHIN A LEVANTINE MEGA-REGION

The Palestinian economy is small. Even with internal barriers removed and borders relatively open, the growth and development prospects for the Palestinian economy will be dependent on its openness and connection to the broader region. Its economic success will inevitably be tied to its ability to engage in greater economic and social cooperation and functioning as part of a **transnational region**.

In the 21st century, urban regions are becoming more important than ever before; they accommodate most of the world’s population and dominate the world’s economic and cultural life. **In this urban age, size matters.** Large well-connected regions can draw on a bigger pool of labor and talent, develop more complex and specialized economies, support larger and more effective infrastructure, and leverage their connectivity as global hubs.

Groups of nearby cities work together, sometimes informally, as part of a larger system. In this way they **share talent, infrastructure and economic assets**. Individual cities can specialize in complementary ways. In doing so, their related populations can perform more strongly together than they could on their own.

In some cases, **city-regions can cover entire countries**, or even span national borders. Such regions do not supersede nations; they optimize economic and social opportunities within the broader territory and make it easier for people to access opportunities.

PALESTINE EMERGING capitalizes on the promise of an **ambitious and realistic Growth Scenario**. Regardless of any evolving political outcomes, we believe Palestine will develop comparative advantages (including regulatory arbitrage) within its connected territory, which is itself within an evolving Levantine Mega-Region approaching 50 million inhabitants.

PALESTINE EMERGING: THE LONG-TERM VIEW

LEVANTINE MEGA-REGION (economic structure)

Trade and exchange.
The built-up area of the Levantine Mega-Region encompasses major cities. Despite varying regulatory and political systems, the Levant functions as a coherent trade area, bridging between the economies of Africa and Eurasia. Its reputation for collaboration and connectivity attracts and retains talent and investment, competing with other global megacity regions and large metropolitan areas. Cities within the Mega-Region will continue to specialize.

PRECEDENTS: multinational megacity regions include ‘Greater Bay’ (East Asia), and the ‘Blue Banana’ (Northern Europe).

CONNECTED TERRITORY (urban structure)


Connectivity.
The formal urban structure of Palestine anchors the political, economic and cultural life of its population. By joining Gaza and the West Bank with strategic connections, it overcomes the constraints of non-contiguous territory. The urban structure leverages infrastructure connectivity to enable mobility of labor, finance and goods.

PRECEDENTS: Luxembourg, Panama, Qatar, and Malta. These areas are distinct from true city-states such as Singapore in that they comprise both their primary city and a number of peripheral cities and towns with autonomous municipal authorities; they also include substantial rural areas.

UNIFIED CONDITION (legal structure)

Macro-economic stability.
Palestine incorporates a unifying legal framework across Gaza and the West Bank; a range of powers create comparative advantages relative to its peers and within a wider global context.

PRECEDENTS: the regions in Belgium, the cantons in Switzerland, the states of the United States of America, and the emirates in the UAE.




URBANIZATION

3

PALESTINE EMERGING recognizes that coordinated urbanization is the foundation of future growth.

COORDINATED DEVELOPMENT

Well-connected urban territory magnifies the value of Palestine's human capital. Spatially uncoordinated reconstruction and development may be more expedient in the short term, but it will undermine future potential and eventually constrain opportunities for Palestinians in an increasingly competitive and sophisticated world.



COORDINATED URBANIZATION

Our long-term view advocates for **building in the right place**. The physical reconstruction of Gaza will require extraordinary effort.


We anticipate where people will settle, how land uses will coordinate with community centers, strategic road alignments, transport assets, power and water systems, and environmental open spaces.

Gaza will face enormous pressure in the short term to establish temporary housing camps and provide essential infrastructure.

It is important to **define the long-term plan** before committing to short-term development. Temporary assets should not be put in places where they will block strategic corridors and projected urbanization in the future.

See also: Global Palestine Connected Gaza


URBANIZATION PRINCIPLES



BUILD IN THE RIGHT PLACE

Focus Gaza's urban growth and **avoid sprawl** in order to promote resilient communities, maximize investment potential and preserve the environment.

Plan residential development in rebuilt Gaza City, Deir Al Balah, Khan Yunis and Rafah around urban centers to **maximize pedestrian accessibility** to community facilities, services, and employment.




GROW TO THE NORTH

Concentrate urban growth and strategic transport in the north of Gaza. This maximizes the value of large infrastructure investments and creates urban areas with the critical mass for a globally connected Palestine.


Strategic assets, including a port, airport, industrial zone, and a Gaza-West Bank Link, create regional and international connectivity. Gaza City and Khan Yunis will absorb the greater share of urban growth to become a nearly contiguous urban area.

The south will return to a lower urban density, preserving key agricultural and environmental areas, and low-intensity coastal tourism.




CONNECT FROM THE EDGE

Create a **high-capacity road and rail spine** along Gaza's northern and eastern boundaries to serve key industrial sites and **remove heavy traffic from urban and environmental areas**. Connect to Gaza's towns from the high-capacity spine with secondary roads.




BUILD ON HISTORY

Gaza's urban areas grew as trading centers along the Via Maris (now Salah Al-Din Road), with connections to the coast. **Adapt this historic structure as the basis for contemporary urban development**, maintaining Salah Al-Din as the primary connector. **Retain the identity of Gaza's four towns**. Develop Salah Al-Din as a pedestrian-friendly urban throughfare and key public transport corridor. Connect urban centers to the coast with enhanced east-west routes (such as Omar Al Mokhtar Street).




RECOVER NATURE

Restore Gaza's environment to support wildlife and promote recreational activity. **Preserve the coastline** and the Mawasi dune system. Define a high-quality agricultural base around urban areas to provide local food. **Integrate a network of green open spaces** into the urban areas.




SHORT TERM (<2030) MICRO-SCALE

Political and security conditions remain a major constraint. **Reconstruction focuses on current challenges** and urgent needs, most notably in relation to humanitarian stabilization, ordnance removal, water and energy, environmental degradation, and socioeconomic collapse. **There is a temporary connection** between Gaza and the West Bank




MEDIUM TERM (<2040) MESO-SCALE

The multi-layered system of restrictions hindering development in Palestine – and Gaza in particular – is progressively lifted. There is sustained progress towards **greater openness and connectivity**, including a **strategic link between Gaza and the West Bank** via Hebron, and from Hebron to Ramallah and Nablus via an improved highway.



LONG TERM (<2050) MACRO-SCALE

Gaza and the West Bank accommodate a population of around 13 million people, with development focused on **regional and international trade and exchange**. Palestine functions within an emerging trans-national Levantine Mega-Region and is integrated with core urban centers in neighboring countries. Maritime corridors to Cyprus (Europe) and an air corridor to Dubai (Gulf) complement strategic links east to Jordan and south to Africa.



CONNECTIVITY

4

PALESTINE EMERGING addresses infrastructure under Palestinian jurisdiction as well as systems that integrate Palestine with the broader region.

URBAN DEVELOPMENT, MOBILITY

SURFACE TRANSPORT CONNECTIVITY

PALESTINE EMERGING supports a **comprehensive multi-modal transport network** for the West Bank and Gaza Strip along with a phased development strategy.

We anticipate the Surface Transport strategy will evolve over three time frames and related scales:

SHORT TERM/ Micro-Scale
(within the West Bank and within the Gaza Strip)

MEDIUM TERM/ Meso-Scale
(between the West Bank and Gaza Strip)

LONG TERM/ Macro-Scale
(between the West Bank/Gaza Strip
and the Region)

The Surface Transport network includes a National **Territorial Corridor** between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and major 'back-bones': **North-South multi-modal spines** in both Gaza and the West Bank (for rail + road).

The network also includes **diffused multi-modal infrastructure** throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip to connect disjointed fragments of the existing road network. This will incorporate public transport networks, including **BRT systems**, to connect Bethlehem, East Jerusalem, Gaza City, Hebron, Nablus and Ramallah. High-frequency services connect with the **Territorial Corridor** and **North-South multi-modal spines** at designated terminals. **Low-speed infrastructure**, including cycling highways and pedestrian thoroughfares in both Gaza and the West Bank, knits together communities and moderates demand on road networks.

To boost freight and logistics capacities, the surface transport network also incorporates **expanded facilities at border crossings**.

See also:

- PNA Road and Transportation Master Plan
- Global Palestine Connected Gaza
- The Arc
- Forthcoming RAND study on West Bank Spatial Plan



The Portland Trust and The Palestinian Private Sector (2016).

SEA AND AIR CONNECTIVITY

Economic viability for Gaza and the West Bank depends on trade with regional and global markets. PALESTINE EMERGING recognises the strategic importance of developing primary infrastructure corridors to support regional and international trade.

In the short term, rebuild the **Gaza Fishing Port** and upgrade infrastructure to accommodate 'Roll-On/Roll-Off' landings on an interim basis. Link the Fishing Port to secondary roads and the High-Capacity Spine.

Establish a short-range, electric vertical take-off and landing (**eVTOL**) **Feeder Service** to carry passengers from Gaza to air hubs in the West Bank (e.g. the former Jerusalem Airport) and Amman International Airport; this will be an efficient, sustainable, and cost-sensitive link to the global air network and a 'leapfrog' opportunity. Develop the **Gaza Airfield** at the northern end of Gaza to accommodate short-haul services. Integrate the airfield with Gaza Industrial Port, Gaza High-Capacity Spine, and the Gaza-West Bank Link to create a quad-modal transport hub.

GAMECHANGER

GAZA / WEST BANK CORRIDOR

A strategic link between northern Gaza and the southern West Bank will enable dependable movement of goods and eventually people between these two areas.

The Gaza/West Bank Corridor will be established over several phases:

SHORT TERM

Bonded containers on open roads between Gaza and the West Bank. Focused on delivering humanitarian aid (primarily food and medicine).

MEDIUM TERM

Dedicated corridor link. Potential technical systems include segregated road or rail, tunnels, high-speed maglev, etc. Initially focused on cargo only.

LONG TERM

Dedicated corridor link. System to carry passengers and cargo. Domestic Travel Scheme for passengers between Gaza and the West Bank allows free movement (without border controls).



Palestine Ministry of Transport (2016).

The Gaza-West Bank Corridor will be a Palestinian project but located on Israeli territory, for exclusive use by Palestine. Previously-discussed long-term lease arrangements will ensure the corridor is sealed for Israeli-security purposes. There will be design provisions for a potential intermediate stop that could be used as part of a common economic zone or for an interchange between entities. The corridor will extend with incremental stops into the West Bank.

Mobility corridors between two areas over a third-party area exist in many places. There were dedicated corridors between West Germany and West Berlin when Germany was divided.

Mulhouse airport situated entirely on French territory without interference by French authorities.

German territory, is now entirely within Belgium but still maintains five small German exclaves.

Russia-Kaliningrad has a sealed train agreement.

Switzerland has a corridor to the Swiss part of Basel/

Vennbahn railway, originally built across what used to be

FUTURE REGIONAL EXPANSION PLANS

The Gaza-West Bank Corridor potentially connects to India, UAE, Saudi, Jordan, and Europe via the proposed India – Middle East – Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).

India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)
IMEC is a planned economic corridor that aims to bolster economic development by fostering connectivity and economic integration between Asia, the Arabian Gulf and Europe. The proposed corridor would run from India to Europe

through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel and Greece.

The project was launched to bolster transportation and communication links between Europe and Asia through rail and shipping networks and is seen as a counter to China's

Belt and Road Initiative and would also create comparative advantages against transits through the Suez Canal. The memorandum of understanding document has already mapped out the potential geography of a corridor.

GAMECHANGER

GAZA ISLAND PORT

Develop a deepwater port on an artificial island off the northern end of Gaza, not to be confused with any other proposals, e.g., to build an artificial island in the Mediterranean Sea or a temporary humanitarian port. Unlike an inland port, extensive research has suggested that an island port's offshore location would reduce dredging requirements and minimize impact on the sensitive beach waterfront. The Island Port will include logistics areas for containerized shipping, an LNG terminal, cruise-ship berths, a commercial marina, and a recreational park.

Initial damage assessment in Gaza estimate almost 30 million tons of debris and rubble will remain after the current conflict is over. It will take 8-10 years to remove the rubble. We propose that this material from Gaza can be used as fill material to build up the mass of the island.

The island port's connecting causeway will extend to an integrated inland industrial zone, linked to high-capacity road and rail alignments, an airport logistics zone, as well as the Gaza-West Bank Link. Anchor logistics and freight companies will be concentrated at the port and the industrial zone. Related incentives will encourage industrial companies to establish manufacturing plants in a free trade zone.


The island port will enable a broad range of industrial activities, highlighted in the GROWTH chapter. These activities will support regional trade and the export of complex, high-value goods in which Palestine has a relative competitive advantage. The Gaza Island Port will be part of the wider network of ports in the Mediterranean region, enhancing regional and global connectivity via the movement of goods and people.


In the Port of Hamburg, one berth creates approximately 18,000 direct jobs, 2,000 indirect jobs, and generates a direct value of 290M Euros and 80M Euros in taxes per year.

Hamburg Port Authority (2019).

The total employment effects of ports (direct and indirect/induced) are significant and typically represent between 1% and 5% of the total employment in a country.

Notteboom, T. et al (2022).





NETWORKS

5

PALESTINE EMERGING believes there is an opportunity to ‘leapfrog’ legacy solutions and establish a resilient network of utilities to serve local and regional interests.

ENERGY, WATER, DIGITAL

ENERGY

For decades, Gaza has faced critical shortages in energy supply. Prior to the recent conflict, Gaza’s power supply could only meet 45% of estimated demand, causing rolling power cuts, crippling economic activity, and undermining water treatment, sanitation, health and social services.

Energy and water issues are closely interrelated: without increased energy supply, desalination and improved wastewater treatment are not possible. **Enhancing Gaza’s electrical grid** and securing sustainable long term energy are essential to unlock Gaza’s broader economic recovery, not only to power normal economic activities but to secure reliable sources of potable water.

Our projections assume, by 2040, energy demand per capita (and the energy-intensity of commercial/industrial uses) will rise to a level similar to more developed regional economies, such as present-day Turkiye, and remain stable thereafter. Total peak demand – consisting mostly of domestic use – will be over 2,500 MW (*Figure 15*), a five-fold increase over the pre-October 2023 level of 470 MW. Water-related energy demand will also increase, but will represent a relatively small share of total energy consumption.

Beyond the provision of **interim energy supply** (including provisional links to Egyptian and Israeli networks), we anticipate the implementation of **Gas for Gaza**, Gaza Power Plant **gas convergence**, and **increasing capacity for the Gaza Power Plant** to 560 MW.

Longer-term, we anticipate the Palestinian entity will have an **independent high-voltage grid**, and integration with **West Bank and regional utility networks**. Gaza will develop a **large-scale Solar Photovoltaic (PV) plant**, exploiting extensive areas along its eastern boundary that can accommodate PV fields. Similarly, the West Bank will develop extensive solar farms in Area C. Gaza and the West Bank will supplement central energy production with **Package Solar PV plants**, including innovative local solutions like **Virtual Powerplants**.

As Gaza restructures its economy, Palestine will exploit the offshore **Gaza Marine** natural gas field, exporting to Egypt for processing.

PROJECTED PEAK ENERGY DEMAND, MW




Figure 15 | QUARTET (2024a)

GAZA MARINE

Gaza Marine is a natural gas field located approximately 36 kilometers off the coast of the Gaza Strip. Developing the field represents one of the most significant projects for the long term sustainability of the Palestinian economy, offering decades of significant revenue opportunities.

WHAT IS A VIRTUAL POWERPLANT?

Virtual Powerplants are distributed energy hubs in neighborhoods; they use rooftop solar on new housing and commercial premises, linked to community batteries.

Excess renewable energy is stored in the community batteries to provide energy during non-daylight hours. Each neighborhood energy node acts as an autonomous power network.

The neighbourhood energy nodes connect to the newly established Gaza grid system through an energy management platform, creating a Gaza-wide Virtual Power Plant (VPP). This will allow communities and businesses to sell unused renewable energy back to the grid for use elsewhere or export.

GAZA WATER STRATEGY – 2050





Figure 16 | PORTLAND TRUST AND THE PALESTINIAN PRIVATE SECTOR (2016)

WATER SUPPLY / WASTE WATER TREATMENT

The rate of water abstraction from the Gaza aquifer is nearly four times the sustainable yield of 55 MCM/annum. The aquifer is highly polluted because of seawater intrusion and contamination from untreated wastewater, with only 4% considered suitable for human consumption. Wastewater collection and processing infrastructure is severely deficient; even before October 2023 only 60% of households were connected to the sewage network, and around 90 million liters of partially treated sewage were discharged into the Mediterranean Sea each day.

PALESTINE EMERGING supports initiatives to **secure sustainable long term water supply** for Gaza, sufficient to meet total water demand of approximately 260 MCM/year by 2050.


GAZA WASTE WATER STRATEGY – 2050



The **Gaza/West Bank Link** will connect utility networks in Gaza and the West Bank. Solutions will include a **centralized regional-scale desalination plant** (delivering 250 MCM/year) to supplement groundwater supply and **position Gaza as a net exporter of water**. Short-term water treatment efforts will focus on **repairing existing plants** in Khan Yunis, Deir Al Balah and Gaza City.

Coordinated water management will **improve the efficiency of water and waste water networks**. All treatment plants will be capable of producing tertiary-quality recycled water (suitable for agriculture). **Educational campaigns** and **local enforcement** will help shut down illegal wells and boost the adoption of recycled **greywater for irrigation**.

SHORT TERM: PRIORITIZE INVESTMENT INTO GAS-FOR-GAZA AND A LARGER DESALINATION PLANT IN THE SOUTH



QUARTET (2024a,b)

PROVISION OF ADEQUATE WATER SUPPLY FOR CONSUMPTION IS A SHORT-TERM IMPERATIVE IN GAZA




Figure 17 | ANERA (2023)




Figure 18 | CSIS (2024)

ELECTRICITY PRICES IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ARE HIGHER THAN EGYPT AND JORDAN; IN THE LONG RUN, RENEWABLE ENERGY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TO LOWER COSTS AND DIVERSIFY ENERGY SOURCES




Figure 19 | Palestinian Investment Promotion Agency (2022). Global Petrol Prices (2023).

GAZA ENERGY DEMAND AND SUPPLY PROFILE




Figure 20 | Quartet (2024a)

DIGITAL NETWORKS

PALESTINE EMERGING understands that digital networks are fundamental for **integrating Gaza and the West Bank into global markets** and **achieving the necessary sectoral shifts** to improve their economies. Digitized industries increasingly rely on internet connectivity, big data, 5G, and artificial intelligence to increase capital and labor productivity and obtain goods and services at lower prices, thus contributing to economic growth.

After decades of relative technological stagnation, strategic digital networks will enable Palestine to ‘leapfrog’ certain levels of development, similar to the way China bypassed the slow implementation of local landline communications and transitioned directly to mobile technology, or some African metropolitan areas moved beyond traditional energy networks to smart off-grid energy.

Palestine currently does not control its own ICT infrastructure. Palestinians in the West Bank are only able to use 3G mobile services, while those in Gaza only get 2G – these are considerably slower than global standards and are more vulnerable to security attacks due to weaker encryption. Israel is upgrading from 4G to 5G. Palestinian cellular communication companies have lost up to \$2B/year in potential revenue due to restrictions on frequencies and equipment alongside unauthorized competition from Israeli operators.

Digital connectivity is lifesaving. During initial periods of reconstruction, trained personnel and medical equipment will be in critically short supply. Reliable high-speed digital bandwidth will allow patients to access **tele-health systems** and link to regional and international doctors, specialists and diagnostic services to help make up deficits in local health resources. In the short term, **extensive WiFi** for temporary camps and housing will support stabilization efforts and increase earning potential for related populations.

Students with poor access to schools and educational material will connect to regional and global peers and educators through remote-learning systems like **Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs)**, providing an affordable and flexible way to learn new skills, advance careers and access quality educational experiences at scale.

In the medium term, **connectivity hubs** will leverage available fiber broadband connections, bringing connectivity to critical community infrastructure like hospitals, clinics, and schools – the core of redeveloping communities.

Digital capacities will expand to include **5G towers** and **mesh networks**. Connectivity hubs will be replicated across Gaza and the West Bank, extending broadband coverage to commercial and personal domains.

In the long term, position Palestine as a **test bed** for emerging **6G-technology** – similar to the way Monaco (another relatively small, spatially constrained territory) has been a testing ground for new mobile standards.

6G (sixth-generation wireless) is the successor to 5G cellular technology. 6G networks will be able to use higher frequencies than 5G networks and provide substantially higher capacity and much lower latency. The 6G technology market is expected to facilitate large improvements in the areas of imaging, presence technology and location awareness. Working in conjunction with artificial intelligence (AI), the 6G computational infrastructure

will be able to identify the best place for computing to occur; this includes decisions about data storage, processing and sharing.

6G is not yet a functioning technology. While some vendors are investing in the next-generation wireless standard, industry specifications for 6G-enabled network products remain years away.

First lab testing and pilots of 6G are expected to begin in 2028, preparing 6G for commercial release in or near 2030. Steps toward commercial readiness include the shift from 5G to 5G Advanced in 2024-2025.

GAMECHANGER

WATER INDEPENDENCE

Access to water is a foundational need. For the region in general and Gaza in particular, water and power are inextricably related. Gaza will need to produce desalinated water for its own requirements and to reduce pressure on its aquifer. To do so will require energy.

Investment in centralized desalination will help Palestine achieve water and energy independence in the long run. Parallel efforts include the repair and construction of other smaller desalination plants (e.g., in Gaza City and in Rafah) as well as initiatives to increase electricity supply.

In the long term, Gaza can arbitrage the relative values of water and power to achieve comparative advantages. The relatively low renewable energy prices in Jordan (where availability of land is high) will allow Palestine to import energy at a discount. In exchange, Gaza can supply treated water from its expanded desalination plants to Jordan, where water prices are high due to shortages. Water supply will help Jordan preserve its natural systems and accelerate peacemaking efforts in the region.


SHORT TERM

- Invest in the Gas-for-Gaza project (to provide 600MW of electricity for Gaza).
- Repair and expand the Southern Short Term Low Volume Desalination Plant (STLV) to 250 MCM.
- Convert and expand the Gaza Power Plant to accommodate natural gas.

LONG TERM

Once Palestine can more than meet its own needs, it can arbitrage the relative values of water and power to achieve comparative advantages relative to the region, and develop an export-related commodity.

LONG TERM: GAZA EXPORTS DESALINATED WATER TO JORDAN.
JORDAN SELLS SOLAR AND WIND ENERGY TO GAZA.



Ecopeace Middle East (2024).

PALESTINE EXTENSION TO JORDAN-ISRAEL-UAE GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE

In 2022, the Kingdom of Jordan and the United Arab Emirates signed an advanced memorandum of understanding to meet COP28 targets, build water security, and advance regional prosperity through two levels of bilateral partnership.

The first level will launch a 600 MW solar photovoltaic plant and 300 MW of electric storage in Jordan, with the aim of producing clean energy for export.

Prosperity Blue is a sustainable water desalination project that aims to produce and export 200 million cubic meters of potable water to Jordan every year.

GAMECHANGER

5G NETWORK

5G is the fifth-generation technology standard for cellular networks, which cellular phone companies began deploying worldwide in 2019. 5G allows for the convergence of multiple legacy networking functions to achieve cost, power, and complexity reductions. For Gaza in particular, this will be a 'leapfrog' upgrade from its legacy 2G systems.

In the short to medium term, Gaza in particular will depend on resources that will be absent from the immediate area. Interim housing and emergency camps will have very high concentrations of people in need of digital connectivity. Healthcare systems will lack trained professionals and diagnostic technology. Education, especially higher-level institutions, will need to function in virtual/remote settings.

Enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB) uses 5G as a progression from 4G LTE mobile broadband services, with faster connections, higher throughput, and more capacity. This will benefit areas of higher traffic, including urban areas in general, and special locations such as hospitals and schools.

Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency Communications (URLLC) are the basis for mission-critical applications that require uninterrupted and robust data exchange. This will benefit activities like remote surgical operations.

Massive Machine-Type Communications (mMTC) are particularly useful to support large concentrations of civilian drones and IoT devices, aiding in disaster recovery efforts, and providing real-time data for emergency responders. Autonomous vehicles will also benefit from 5G technology.


APPLICATION FOR GAZA/WEST BANK

Gaza's relatively flat terrain allows for 5G towers spaced approximately 1.6-5Km apart, a total of 100-150 towers communicating with each other. In addition, tower placements and additional software will support a mesh network that maintains local and regional connectivity if/when international connectivity is interrupted.

5G towers are linked to centralized data transmission hubs, connected by high-capacity fiber which is in turn linked to broader networks (e.g. Egypt and Jordan). Alternatively, high-capacity microwave can transmit over 20-30 km with line-of-sight. This is a more expensive solution but offers connectivity without physical transit across an Israeli border.

Based on Oxford Economics research, 5G has the potential to boost productivity by 1.7%, and increase GDP 10% by 2030

Cabello, K. (2023).



SOCIAL ASSETS

6

PALESTINE EMERGING recognizes that temporary solutions tend to last a long time; sites for short-term social assets must be chosen with care.

HEALTH, HOUSING, EDUCATION

Immediate humanitarian recovery actions carried out by the United Nations and other related agencies include provision for healthcare, housing assistance, education, and community services.

Cluster social assets so they **focus urban growth** and help accelerate the delivery of permanent solutions across different sectors.

Plan residential development in Gaza City, Deir Al Balah, Khan Yunis, and Rafah around clustered social assets to **maximize pedestrian accessibility** to community facilities, services, and employment.

HEALTHCARE EXCELLENCE

PALESTINE EMERGING supports the development of modern, tech-enabled healthcare infrastructure that integrates both public and private systems.

SHORT TERM

- Focus on provision of basic, primary care
- Invest in HealthTech pilot projects

MEDIUM TERM

- Scale HealthTech pilots
- Restructure secondary and tertiary care
- Introduce remote clinics.

LONG TERM

- Consolidate private and public health systems
- Standardize digital systems

Healthcare recovery will emphasize **collaboration between the private and public sectors** (including aid agencies) to capture synergies and reduce duplication of investments.

In the short term, we anticipate acute shortages of healthcare practitioners and diagnostic equipment; the private sector will play a crucial role to best position human resources and accelerate the importation/movement of healthcare equipment and medicine. Establish **private clinics** and a **network of nurse practitioners**.

In the long term, construct healthcare assets with **standardized and modular construction techniques**. Cluster healthcare assets near other social infrastructure. Support quality healthcare education via **hospital placements** and **exchange programs** with regional hospitals.

Digital innovations, including **centralized, digital patient record systems** and a **telehealth platform**, enable regional doctors to support patients unable to access formal healthcare facilities. 5G systems and investments into the ICT sector will support these digital enablers. Encourage financial institutions to launch a **private national health insurance system** for workers in formal employment. In the long term, lower the per-capita cost of healthcare delivery to increase access to health services.

COMMUNITY LIVING

PALESTINE EMERGING promotes local neighborhood centers as a unit of resilience, integrating housing, healthcare, education, and cultural exchange. Establish Gazan-led initiatives to weave together work, life, and leisure with communal traditions and the ethos of Palestinian society.

SHORT TERM

- Focus on occupancy assistance
- Establish a secure environment

MEDIUM TERM

- Transition into more permanent housing solutions

LONG TERM

- Develop mixed-use neighborhoods around community hubs
- Expand urban boundaries by connecting to other community hubs

Resolve land disputes before starting formal development. Implement **legal and financing mechanisms** to support the acquisition of land. To encourage high-quality mixed-use development, allow original landowners to benefit from the redevelopment of their land.

Accelerate neighborhood-scale development with high-density **modular housing systems**. Develop supply and manufacturing chains within Palestine and **train local workforces** in modular manufacturing to provide jobs and economic development. Deliver efficient **smaller urban apartments** that meet the demand of younger and more independent populations. Create **low-interest financing products** and **subsidize upfront investments** to accelerate community development.

Neighborhoods are the units of social and environmental resilience. Strong neighborhood designs allow residents to access a wide variety of daily services within short travel distances; they feature public spaces and buildings with active street frontages to provide retail and social amenities and improve street-level security.

See also:

C40/ARUP's 'Green and Thriving Neighborhoods'

NEXT-GENERATION EDUCATION

PALESTINE EMERGING supports the development of a next-generation education system that trains students' critical thinking and prepares them for employment with relevant technical skills. We anticipate acute shortages of physical facilities and trained teaching staff in the short term. Make **educational facilities central to urban development**. Develop specialized institutions that attract international interest and investment while building on Palestinian themes.

SHORT TERM

- Develop hybrid/digital TeleEd systems to overcome the shortage of resources

MEDIUM TERM

- Anchor urban developments with new/rebuilt educational facilities
- Pilot new curriculum and digital delivery models

LONG TERM

- Develop specialized academic centers

Physical and economic reconstruction will require vast amounts of local capabilities for years; **train local students for reconstruction-related roles**. Develop education hubs for business administration and public policy, to educate future leaders for the broader region. Incorporate digital training into the education system to prepare students for employment in a 5G/AI enabled economy.

Expose Palestinian students to global perspectives; supplement local programs with selected **Massive Open Online Courses** (MOOCs), partnering with regional and international institutions. Support the translation of more foreign language books into Arabic, to breach language barriers and introduce new, constructive ways of thinking.

Norway launched the EduApp4Syria initiative in 2015, which addressed the educational crisis faced by Syrian children displaced by conflict. With smartphone applications like "Feed the Monster" and "Antura and the Letters," the project demonstrated the potential of technology to aid reading skills and improve psychosocial well-being through engaging, open-source educational games.

GAMECHANGER

TELEHEALTH PLATFORM

Develop a centralized platform to provide remote healthcare consultations for communities in both the West Bank and Gaza, connecting them with healthcare practitioners.

The platform will serve as a mechanism to engage with doctors and volunteers within and outside Palestine, enabling them to participate in the healthcare sector without having to be based in the region. It is part of a broader healthcare plan to digitize and upgrade the sector in Palestine and across the region.

Initially, the platform will focus on three types of services: 1) mental health consultation 2) teleradiology and 3) telepathology, areas projected to have the highest level of unmet need after active hostilities have stopped.

Over time, the platform can be scaled across the broader West Bank and Gaza region and expand into other areas of medicine. The implementation of this platform will cut the cost of services by reducing patient transportation costs and optimizing doctors' productive hours.

Globally, implementation of telehealth programs reduced health system costs in the short to medium term in 53% of cost minimization studies, 50% of cost effectiveness studies and 32% of cost-utility studies. The predominant reason for lower costs was the reduction or avoidance of health system-funded travel by patients and clinicians.

Snoswell, C.L., (2020).

GAMECHANGER

TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF RECONSTRUCTION (TUR)

Develop a degree-granting institution that delivers a comprehensive suite of academic programs focused on **Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Economic Development**. The Technical University of Reconstruction will be the first purpose-built institution of its kind – geographically located at the core of one of the highest profile identity-based conflict areas in the world.

This institution will anchor a new mixed-use quarter in a regenerated area of northern Gaza.

STUDY AREAS

The TUR will integrate programs for researchers to examine the context of contemporary armed conflict and war, how peace advances at local and national levels, and analysis of domestic and international actors. Degree candidates will undertake fieldwork placements with critical reconstruction efforts, ranging from the deployment of modular housing to the creation and management of financial instruments that underwrite reconstruction.

VOCATIONAL TRAINING


The TUR will incorporate a major vocational program, training the local workforce to address aspects of post-conflict reconstruction. Students will develop skills related to physical challenges like ordnance clearance, built-hazard removal, environmental remediation, and family reconciliation. Students and graduates of this program will work alongside national and international aid agencies, and it will create informed and capable individuals able to undertake a wide range of value-added roles in the future.

INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIP AND EXCHANGE

The TUR will partner with international institutions and consultancies to facilitate knowledge transfer, help students build international relationships, broaden their perspectives, and increase access to global graduate job opportunities.

Durham University in the UK supports close to 17,000 jobs. Every pound received in income generates almost five pounds in economic impact.

Durham University (2022).



GROWTH



PALESTINE EMERGING recognizes the challenges and opportunities for the Palestinian economy are central to all progress.

INDUSTRIAL SECTORS, NEW ECONOMIC PARADIGMS

Gaza has been severely constrained by blockades and restrictions on the movement of people and goods. This has resulted in a massively undersized economy, chronically high unemployment and low GDP per capita. The current conflict has devastated every economic sector in Gaza, leading to an estimated loss of more than half of output and unemployment above 75%.

Gaza can realize substantial potential once conflict ends and historic constraints are lifted. Given the strong link between poverty and armed conflict, an unprecedented expansion of the economy is essential to improve living standards and reduce unemployment to a sustainable level. The scale of this challenge is increased further by a rapidly-growing population and young age structure.

PALESTINE EMERGING's growth scenario assumes:

- An end to armed conflict and occupation.
- The easing of restrictions on movement of construction materials.
- A significant internationally-supported reconstruction effort.
- A progressive shift to greater regional openness in the medium-to-long term.

These assumptions are ambitious, but achieving anything less will lead to further economic deterioration, contributing to renewed cycles of violence.

GROWTH SCENARIO

3.5 million population by 2050

610,000 new jobs required (3x increase)

\$33 billion annual GDP through unleashing Gaza's economic potential (10x increase)

540,000 new housing units needed by 2050

10x growth in the construction sector to enable reconstruction

ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION

The physical reconstruction of Gaza will generate a massive economic stimulus in the short-and medium-term. This will require an order-of-magnitude increase in the size of the construction sector compared to the pre-war level. In addition, it will generate secondary activity across a range of other sectors (such as manufacturing, transportation and services). This assumes the availability of international finance for reconstruction, easing of trade restrictions, and capacity-building and skill development to scale the construction sector to the size required.

RECOVERING BASIC ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS

Due to the historical constraints on Gaza's economy, a range of basic economic functions that serve Gaza's population were, even before the war, undersized in comparison to a 'typical' urban economy. This includes local commerce, basic business services and transportation. As constraints are lifted and the broader economy develops, such basic sectors would be expected to expand, contributing to economic growth.

EMERGING SECTORS

Beyond immediate reconstruction and recovery, a range of tradable sectors within Gaza can develop a comparative advantage, driving meaningful long-term development. These include agriculture, manufacturing, trade and transportation, tourism, services and the digital economy.

CONFLICT AND GDP PER CAPITA BY COUNTRY




Figure 21 | ACLED (2023), World Bank (2022)

ACLED conflict index assesses every country and territory in the world according to four indicators - deadliness, danger to civilians, geographic diffusion, and armed group fragmentation - based on analysis of political violence event data

*GDP per capita based on latest available data for each country

Without a rapid improvement in economic conditions, the region is likely to experience a continued, vicious cycle of conflict. Research (including UNDP, 2007) provides vast evidence of the close relationship between economic underdevelopment and the likelihood of observing armed conflict: weak economic performance makes conflict more likely; in turn, armed conflict destroys productive assets and interrupts economic activity, resulting in long-lasting negative consequences for economic development. The risks of conflict are heightened in countries with low per capita income, weak and volatile growth, high unemployment (particularly among youth) and horizontal inequalities, conditions which are all prevalent in Gaza.

Figure 21 shows the statistical correlation between GDP per capita and conflict, based on the Conflict Index of ACLED for a large sample of countries. As shown in the Figure, Palestine has one of the lowest GDP per capita figures and one of the highest conflict intensity scores, higher than that of Ukraine.

MODELING RESULTS

Gaza’s population is projected to increase from around 2.2 million in 2022 to 3.5 million by 2050. This accounts for demographic factors (e.g. age structure and fertility rates). It also assumes a level of economically-driven emigration, including to the West Bank, as restrictions on movement are eased.

GAZA POPULATION PROJECTION, 2050




Figure 22 | TEAM ANALYSIS

Under the assumed conditions, Gaza’s employment base could grow to nearly 900,000 by 2050, eventually bringing unemployment down to sustainable levels. This requires creating 610,000 additional jobs by 2050, more than tripling the size of the pre-war employment base. This also assumes a share of the Gazan labor force working outside Gaza (West Bank or Israel) in the longer term.

GAZA JOBS AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATE PROJECTION, 2050




Figure 23 | TEAM ANALYSIS

SECTORAL CHANGE

Figures 24 and 25 demonstrate the sectors underpinning employment growth.

- **Construction** could increase massively in the medium-term to meet reconstruction needs, and remains a large sector going forward to support population growth.
- **Commerce, Hotels and Restaurants** are currently undersized relative to Gaza’s population. This could grow significantly in the long term to reach a more typical size relative to population, eventually contributing the largest absolute number of jobs.

- **Tradable sectors** - including **Industry** and **Professional and Technical Services** – will grow consistently in the medium-to-long term as Gaza develops international competitive advantage.
- **Social, Personal and Community Services, Public Administration and Education and Health** grow as a function of population.
- **Agriculture** remains constant as it is limited by available land, though productivity within the sector could increase.

EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR PROJECTION




Figure 24 | TEAM ANALYSIS

EMPLOYMENT GROWTH PROJECTION




Figure 25 | TEAM ANALYSIS

EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR PROJECTION




Figure 26 | TEAM ANALYSIS

GDP

If the scenario above can be achieved, while also growing productivity within sectors, Gaza’s per capita GDP could reach over USD 9,000 by 2050, achieving the status of a middle-income economy. Following immediate recovery from the war, this would require sustaining a total GDP growth rate of 10% per year between 2030 and 2050.

GAZA GDP PROJECTION




Figure 27 | TEAM ANALYSIS

STRATEGIC ECONOMIC SECTORS

The following strategic sectors have particular potential to drive Gaza's economic transformation and long-term competitive advantage.

CONSTRUCTION

Rebuilding from the current conflict and addressing pre-existing deficits of housing and infrastructure will require **upscaling of the construction sector** beyond any past historical level. Gaza will need to construct more than 540,000 dwellings by 2050, or more than 20,000 per year on average (comparable to annual housing completions in London); this effort will require an extraordinary **capacity-building and upskilling program**. The construction sector will expand in the short-to-medium term and remain large in the long term to support ongoing population growth.

MANUFACTURING

Developing manufacturing will require re-investing in facilities and capital which have been severely damaged during the war. Reconstruction and rehabilitation will create significant **demand for construction materials**, which will stimulate the local manufacturing sector. There will also be natural growth across many light manufacturing activities, including **food and drink processing** and basic consumer goods serving local needs.

In addition, Gaza can recover and develop historic, craft intensive industries such as furniture and garments, though these are likely to remain relatively small and niche. In the longer term, Gaza can seek to develop **export-oriented manufacturing**, leveraging its latent strengths including labor cost advantage and a high skills base.

TRADE AND TRANSPORTATION

In the earlier phases, lifting of restrictions will induce significant growth in trade, logistics and transportation. It will re-establish **basic functions** necessary to bring goods to the population, connect manufacturers to raw materials and export markets, and service passenger transport. The Gaza Port and the Gaza West Bank Link will be the largest stimuli for trade.

In the long-term, amid greater regional openness and interconnection, Gaza could take on a broader role as a **transportation gateway serving the region**. Such a role has great historical resonance for Gaza, which has been a trading hub on the Levantine corridor for much of the last 5,000 years.

DIGITAL SERVICES

The tech sector has high potential to drive economic development in Palestine. It builds on **Palestine's key comparative advantage** (its young, entrepreneurial and skilled population), to generate high value-added enterprises, and support high female participation rates. Palestine can leverage its advantageous time zone, English and Arabic proficiency and competitive cost base to export services across the Middle East, wider region and the world. In the short term, the growth will focus on recovery of the outsourcing sector, secured by loss guarantee instruments to attract investment. Further investment in education will be required to unlock the potential of these sectors, which will accelerate in the longer term.

TOURISM

Palestine has **rich tourism assets** stemming from its history, culture and Gaza's mediterranean coastline, which could support growth of the tourism sector following re-construction and the easing of movement restrictions. These assets will attract regional and international interest; the sector has potential to support 160,000 jobs and generate USD 2bn pa by 2030. It will be important to **address safety perceptions** and movement restrictions to support a world-class medium-term tourism offer, drive small businesses, and create jobs. Initially the main drivers are likely to be domestic and **Palestinian diaspora visitors** (for example, there is a strong desire for West Bank residents to visit Gaza's coast). International tourism could increase in the longer term, attracting wealthier independent tourists and young adventurers in the rapidly-growing **"ESG" global tourism segment** who seek experiences related to social justice, authentic culture, economic development and sustainability.

AGRICULTURE

Gaza is notable for having an agricultural sector with high yields, although at the expense of depleting the aquifer that supplies water for domestic needs. While the absolute size of the sector is limited by available land and water, Gaza can continue to increase productivity, and **rationalize crop selection**. Doing so will help Gaza develop associated value chains for domestic consumption and high-value export. The agricultural sector is important for its contribution to food security. Managing water consumption to avoid unsustainable extraction from the aquifer will be critical.

TRAVEL GATEWAYS

Several countries, like Morocco, have created digital travel booking gateways to facilitate provision by local tourism providers, enhancing travel experiences and empowering local businesses to share their unique offerings on a global stage. Visit Oman offers a sound organizational model which would help Palestine push into a tightly-targeted and growing market segment.

CHRISTMAS IN BETHLEHEM

Bethlehem's Hebrew/Aramaic name means 'house of bread', acknowledging the area's original reputation for growing wheat. Only about 20% of Palestinians are Christian, but many Muslim Palestinians are also proud that Jesus was born in a Palestinian Territory. Christmas Eve is celebrated in the Church of the Nativity, led by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Jerusalem.

Christmas is more widely celebrated in the State of Palestine / Palestinian Territories than it is in Israel.

GAMECHANGER

TRADE, CURRENCY AND STANDARDS PIVOT

As power and water are for existence, so money and trade are for the economy. Even with a smoothly functioning internal market, Palestine is a small inward-looking economy with a high trade deficit; more trade is a central requirement for economic progress.

Create leverage over key macroeconomic factors to re-orient the Palestinian economy towards stronger long-term economic growth. **Reform existing customs union arrangements**; create monetary stability and adopt a set of common, export-oriented, standards across Gaza and the West Bank.

Focus on **international trade** with a “Made in Palestine” brand, creating a strong 'trade-not-aid' push. Attract investment through bilateral goodwill trade agreements with the EU, US and the Arab world of some 500m customers. To increase value from trade, create a new framework that removes restrictions on the free movement of goods. Prioritize financial support to export-oriented sectors and activities.

To support international trade, **reduce currency risk** and pivot away from the **Shekel**. Regular and severe cash challenges caused by the current monetary arrangements create systemic risks and impede the availability of local credit; an alternative monetary framework may offer significant benefits and an additional lever of economic policymaking, provided the arrangements replacing it are at least as strong. Global experts are prepared to inform and support this discussion.

In 1983, Hong Kong introduced the Linked Exchange Rate System (LERS), tying the Hong Kong Dollar (HKD) to the US Dollar (USD), which has since fostered a stable monetary climate conducive to economic growth. Although the currency board setup may limit the Monetary Authority's control over monetary policy, the 2005 establishment of a convertibility zone between 7.75 and 7.85 (USD to HKD) signified the Hong Kong Monetary Authority's commitment to intervene by buying or selling USD to maintain the exchange rate within this specified range. Regarding interest rates, which follow the USD and are influenced by the supply and demand for the Hong Kong dollar, the substantial deposit base within Hong Kong's banking sector has enabled major banks to manage their funding costs effectively. The combination of a currency board system and prudent exchange rate and currency reserve management can strengthen a government's fiscal stability.

GAMECHANGER

PALESTINIAN FUND FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT (PFRD)

A dedicated and independent Palestinian-led financial reconstruction and development vehicle will credibly attract and manage major reconstruction funds. Endorsed by international institutions, sovereigns and finance partners, PFRD will fund and support core infrastructure projects. It will raise capital from all global reconstruction partners, leveraging private finance. It will oversee the correct establishment, financing, and delivery of enabling infrastructure projects. The PFRD will also enhance local financial and accountability expertise.

INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION

PFRD will significantly enhance the quantum of investment and funding flowing in from international donors, agencies and leveraged funding, initially for Gaza reconstruction but also for West Bank development. With rigorous international oversight, it will complement and support the delivery of Palestinian reconstruction with financing and co-investment through local vehicles.

ADVISORY AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

PFRD will provide advisory and technical assistance, pooling and drawing from the institutional capabilities of international donors and funders, ensuring alignment, critical mass and leverage rather than duplication and competition.

LOCAL CAPACITY BUILDING

By design, PFRD will select and train local talent to fulfil the roles it will be mandated to deliver, increasing local staff over time, including through Palestinian secondment to global institutions, enhancing talent for the broader banking ecosystem.

BAD ASSETS FUND

Given the scale of losses in Gaza, banking system stability requires a bad-asset fund, with specialist asset management capable of addressing balance sheet liabilities.

ME&NA HAS ONE OF THE LOWEST PRIVATE SECTOR MOBILIZATION RATIOS IN THE WORLD, SUGGESTING HIGHER PERCEIVED RISK



Figure 28 | APAMPA (2023)

COMMERCIAL INVESTORS ORIGINATE DEALS WITH HIGH LEVERAGE RATIOS, IMPACT INVESTORS AND DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES COME A CLOSE SECOND AND THIRD




Figure 29 | APAMPA (2023)

LEVERAGE RATIO INCREASES WITH DEAL SIZE, HIGHLIGHTING THE BENEFITS OF DEAL AGGREGATION






Figure 30 | APAMPA (2023)



SOFT POWER



PALESTINE EMERGING proposes building positive awareness of Palestine through culture and creative engagement.

CULTURE, CREATIVITY, ENTERTAINMENT

Soft power is a persuasive approach to international relations. It seeks to shape the preferences of others through voluntary appeals, and typically involves the use of economic or cultural influence.

Develop an uplifting **post-crisis brand** to shape an overall narrative, creating a messaging strategy and key visuals as a nation branding exercise. Launch a **tourism marketing campaign** aimed at dedicated target groups in selected markets.

Restore historical and cultural sites in Gaza and the West Bank. Consider cultural development strategies implemented in Italy and France. Ensure accessibility, create interpretation centers and education programs.

Launch a **Palestine Film Strategy**. Invest in a streaming-compatible mini-series or a Palestinian telenovela reflecting Palestine's everyday culture and lifestyle. (Role model: South Korea).

Host a **Palestine National Expo** as a 3-4 month long event on land reclaimed for the the future **Gaza Island Port**. Highlight themes related to cultural reconnection. Use **exhibitions and pavilions** to showcase related projects outlined in this report.

Establish a comprehensive initiative to establish, support and boost **creative industries** as a major theme in the region. Create studio districts with **subsidized spaces** for creative activities. Develop environments in the metaverse and other virtual worlds (**leveraging 5G connectivity**) where Palestinians can define their identities, create virtual tourism activities, and realize “regulatory arbitrage” advantages.

Offer a **Palestine Tourism Initiative**, to attract diaspora and other nationals to Palestinian cultural life. Develop industry-scale tourism for both Gaza and the West Bank by promoting relevant sites and destinations. Prepare an enabling and quality **training program** for small hotels and inns.

Anchor a small number of “**PalestiNext**” hubs at key global locations (Cairo, Dubai, Istanbul, Singapore, London, California, Shenzhen, Bangalore), to serve as go-to places for technology and other future-oriented companies, people, and associations to liaise and connect with the local tech/entrepreneur/future ecosystem. Representatives from Palestinian companies, platforms and the start-up ecosystem will run these “PalestiNext” hubs.

Begin to prepare for a **National Memorial** by establishing a **Memorial Task Force** so commemorative dialogue can be as constructive as possible. The Task Force will be supported by a technical advisory committee and staff, in cooperation with agencies charged with reconstruction. Identify a joint commemorative site and develop a broad and **inclusive memorial design process**, which will ultimately incorporate an **urban icon** and **interpretive center**. Integrate the memorial site into broader plans for economic reconstruction.

PALESTINIAN MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER TEAM

Following the examples of Qatar and Saudi Arabia's sports strategies, Palestine will make major investments in its national team to make it more competitive in international tournaments. The team will compete in a future Middle Eastern super league (e.g. KSA, Qatar, Egypt, Palestine) or a European soccer super league.

This team will be similar to other strategic showcase teams such as AS Monaco (Ligue1/France), RB Leipzig (Bundesliga/Germany) or Inter Miami CF (MLS/United States). The team will finance itself through a worldwide fan base, amplifying Palestine's narrative/nation branding.

- Create a temporary training facility
- Get a world recognized coach and staff
- Create the team jersey
- Organize a PR campaign
- Hold open tryouts for youth teams, under 21's, and senior team

STADIUM

Create a national team stadium which can be adapted for other sports and other events, including large-scale music concerts. The venue will anchor urban development, generating direct and indirect employment.

The stadium can be built to accommodate 20,000-25,000 seats on a permanent basis, with the opportunity to increase to 40,000 seats with a temporary overlay.


Stadiums can create a sense of identity and purpose, and communicate values and ambition to future generations. Consider early Roman cities with their amphitheaters. Modern examples in the USA include Fenway Park/Boston and Camden Yards/Baltimore.

Completed in Qatar ahead of the FIFA 2022 World Cup, 'Stadium 974' is a 40,000-seat sports venue; it was the first stadium designed to be fully demountable in FIFA World Cup history. Its modular structure combined repurposed shipping containers and a steel structure, parts of which were recycled. The aim was for the stadium to be dismantled and reassembled in a new location after the football tournament, or repurposed as a series of smaller venues.

The shipping containers, many of which were used to transport construction materials to the venue, served as a nod to Qatar's maritime history and the industrial heritage of the site. The stadium's modular design also reduced construction costs, build time and material waste. Water efficiency methods reduced water use by 40 per cent compared to a conventional stadium development. The shape of the stadium and gaps between the seats facilitate natural ventilation, meaning artificial cooling is not required. This is helped by the stadium's proximity to the sea.

In Castile and León in Spain, four teams - Real Valladolid, Burgos CF, CD Mirandés and SD Ponferradina – represent 113 million euros, 0.2% of the regional GDP, inducing 1,000 jobs.

La Liga (2023).



ENGAGEMENT

9

PALESTINE EMERGING emphasizes civic engagement in the reconstruction process.

The recent 'Roof Over Our Heads' campaign launched at COP27 helps vulnerable and informal settlements build better. The 'Mahila Mandal' or 'women's club' is the lead organization driving the implementation.

GOVERNANCE, PARTICIPATION

PALESTINE EMERGING supports working with civil society groups and leaders to understand their needs, map their skills, and help them prepare for employment and post-conflict transition.

Use **combinations of in-person and digital forums** to encourage constructive contributions by individuals, families, representatives of civil society groups, and surrounding communities. Offer **leadership development programs** to build capacity for strategic collaborations with international agencies. **Define anchor** projects rooted in community and family networks. Prepare local communities for **activities related to reconstruction**. Longer-term, build **permanent governance structures** that coordinate efforts with related international stakeholders.

Support a Palestinian **Fund for Reconstruction and Development**, an over-arching interdisciplinary ministry responsible for overseeing reconstruction, continuously adapting to community needs and feedback, and ensuring effective and inclusive progress. This body will complement the Agency for Reconstruction in implementing critical infrastructure projects.

See also:
Peru Reconstruction with Changes
Saudi Royal Commission

Establish a **Covenant of Mayors**, a formal agreement among local governorates to actively participate in and advance reconstruction efforts, emphasizing the crucial role of local governance in the development process.

Promote Youth **Engagement Programs**. These will include online and in-person initiatives to encourage civic engagement and enhance employability. Related programs will focus on training for freelancing, volunteering, and participation in community projects. Create a **shadow board in the agency for reconstruction** to ensure youth participation.

Launch **Professional and Investment Training** programs to attract local and international investments, leveraging the Palestinian diaspora and international volunteers for the development of commercial skills.

Host **Citizen Assembly Platforms**. These digital forums, managed through pre-agreed protocols, allow the public to communicate their needs directly to delivery agencies, establishing a responsive dialogue between communities and reconstruction bodies.

See also:
Bosnia Citizens' Assemblies
Abu Dhabi's Arab Youth Program

Launch **Pro-Bono Legal Workshops** to educate local communities on legal processes and rights, which will be useful for navigating business and land acquisition challenges during reconstruction, while enhancing legal literacy and empowerment.

See also:
LawWorks UK

Organize a **Palestinian Diaspora Network** to engage with Palestine-related affairs. The network will offer mentorship and networking components, pairing diaspora with local Palestinians.

Convene a **Women's Club**, a secure forum to enfranchise women and young family members and incentivize them to participate in community planning and the broader reconstruction process. Create a global mentorship program to match local women leaders with international women mentors to provide advice, guidance and support.

GAMECHANGER

PALESTINE BOND

Develop a **crowdfunding platform** where individuals around the world can invest in long-term reconstruction bonds to support economic and infrastructure development. The Bond will produce patient capital for investment, generate stable long-term returns on investment and will be deployed to invest in a **selective range of heritage-related projects or specific communities**.


While the Palestine Bond is a financial vehicle intended to support economic growth, its primary characteristic will be to create soft power by fusing Palestinian themes with the interests of a wide range of international and Palestinian diaspora groups.

Various thematic products will cater to the preference and mandates of various groups, e.g., women-owned SME businesses; long-term infrastructure projects; green conservation; preparation of UNESCO sites, and boosting tourism initiatives such as 'Bring Christmas Back To Bethlehem'.

The platform will integrate with approved platforms, e.g., crowdfund me, and partner with various local and international organizations working on advocacy and diaspora group engagement.

During World War II the US introduced more than 100 different war bonds, raising USD 185bn over four years from about 84 million Americans (with an average investment close to USD 2,000).

Chen, J. (2022).



ESSENTIALS

10

PALESTINE EMERGING proposes a collection of gamechanger initiatives that will significantly advance the positive potential of Palestine.

GAMECHANGERS, REFERENCES

GAMECHANGERS

A gamechanger radically alters the path to a potential outcome. Overarching the many ideas highlighted in bold font in the text of this document, the following shortlist represents initiatives that enable economic reconstruction and accelerate related efforts. The selected GAMECHANGERS also promise returns on public and private investment in the short, medium, and long term.

More details about each GAMECHANGER can be found on www.palestine-emerging.org.

GAMECHANGER	CATEGORY	PAGE
Gaza / West Bank Link	Connectivity	040
Gaza Island Port	Connectivity	042
Water Independence	Networks	054
Telehealth Platform	Social Asset	064
Technical University of Reconstruction (TUR)	Social Asset	066
Trade, Currency and Standards Pivot	Growth	080
Palestine Fund for Reconstruction and Development (PFRD)	Growth	082
Palestine Bond	Engagement	094

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